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The Bradleyan Regress, Non-Relational Realism, and the Quinean Semantic Strategy​[1]​

Abstract
Non-Relational Realism is a popular solution to the Bradleyan regress of facts or truths. It denies that there is a relational universal of exemplification; for an object a to exemplify a universal F-ness, on this view, is not for a relation to subsist between a and F-ness. An influential objection to Non-Relational Realism is that it is unacceptably obscure. I argue that Non-Relational Realism can be understood as a selective application of satisfaction semantics to predicates like ‘exemplify’, and that so understood, it is not obscure. This kind of selective use of satisfaction semantics may be feasible in other contexts as a means of making theories more parsimonious.
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1. Introduction
Realism is here understood as the thesis that there are universals, where anything that can be exemplified by multiple entities is a universal. So a typical Realist would believe that whiteness is a universal that is exemplified by, among other things, the White House and the Abernethy pearl. Most Realists take universals to play a role in facts or truths. For example, they would take the fact, or the truth of the proposition, that the White House is white to be a matter of the White House’s exemplifying the universal whiteness.
A long-standing worry about Realism, inspired by F. H. Bradley (1930), is that the Realist’s picture of facts, or of truth, leads to a vicious infinite regress.​[2]​ The argument begins by assuming the
Entitative Explanation Thesis: For any x1, x2,…, xn and any universal Q, if Q(x1, x2,…, xn), then there is an exemplification universal that subsists between x1, x2,…, xn, and Q-ness and that thereby explains why Q(x1, x2,…, xn).
Next, assume for reductio that F(a) for some object a and some universal F-ness, so that, by Entitative Explanation, exemplification subsists between a and F-ness, i.e., E(a, F-ness). But then by Entitative Explanation, we must now explain why E(a, F-ness). And the explanation will take the same form: E(exemplification, a, F-ness). But now we must explain how it is that E(exemplification, a, F-ness), and so on ad infinitum. Because the regress is infinite, it is maintained, the exemplifications of exemplification are never able to ground or satisfactorily explain why F(a). But then, by Entitative Explanation, a is not F. In this way, the Realist’s conception, on which a universal must somehow unite with a distinct object for a fact or truth to obtain, leads to the absurd conclusion that there are no facts or truths.
There is a wide variety of responses to the Bradleyan argument.​[3]​ My concern is to defend one such response, viz.
Non-Relational Realism: For a to exemplify F-ness is not for a and F-ness to stand in a relation. And given that a putative exemplification relation plays no role in such cases of exemplification, we should infer that it does not exist. 
Non-Relational Realism halts the Bradleyan regress at the second “stage”, where exemplification first makes its appearance. Since according to Non-Relational Realism there is no exemplification relation that connects a to F-ness, there is no need to posit a further entity to explain how such a connection would be secured, and so the regress doesn’t get going. By denying that exemplification is a relational entity, Non-Relational Realism presupposes that we don’t need to explain why F(a) by positing such a relational entity. It thus presupposes the falsity of Entitative Explanation.​[4]​,​[5]​
Non-Relational Realism has a long and impressive pedigree. D. M. Armstrong reckons among its adherents Aristotle,​[6]​ Duns Scotus, P. F. Strawson, Gustav Bergmann, and Armstrong himself. The latter describes the thesis as “the ‘great tradition’ of Realistic thought about universals” (1978a, 109). Since I am concerned with the viability of Non-Relational Realism per se, I will not attempt a thorough examination of the various versions of the view that have been advanced, but will instead focus on the core thesis stated above. I believe, though I will not try to show, that my explication and defense of the core thesis suffice for the Non-Relational Realist’s response to the Bradleyan regress and are compatible with views that some Non-Relational Realists associate with the core thesis, such as Armstrong’s claim that universals and particulars are inseparably and intimately connected.​[7]​,​[8]​
I will specifically be defending Non-Relational Realism against the charge that it is unacceptably obscure.​[9]​ I will do so by construing Non-Relational Realism as a use of Quine’s (1980a) semantic strategy for divesting uses of predicates of commitment to universals. But whereas the Quinean semantic strategy is generally viewed as an all-or-nothing matter—as applying to predicates per se as a means to a rejection of universals in general—I propose to understand Non-Relational Realism as a selective application of the Quinean strategy to those predicates, like ‘exemplify’ and ‘instantiate’, that give rise to the regress when interpreted as names of universals. On this understanding, there is nothing obscure about Non-Relational Realism.
The general approach, of which the Non-Relational Realist’s use of the Quinean strategy is an instance, is to avoid commitment to specific universals through selective use of the Quinean strategy. This general approach has not yet been considered in the context of the Bradleyan regress, or elsewhere. However, it may be widely applicable. Thus in section 5, I argue that it may be an effective way of making theories more parsimonious while avoiding some of the pitfalls of rejecting universals per se.
Before proceeding, I emphasize that my aim is to defend Non-Relational Realism from the charge that it is too obscure, which I take to be the leading objection to it. I will not argue positively for Non-Relational Realism, respond at length to independent objections, or compare Non-Relational Realism with other responses to the Bradleyan regress. I will assume, furthermore, that the Bradleyan regress, if it got going, would be vicious, so that Non-Relational Realism is well motivated.

2. The Obscurity Objection
The objection to Non-Relational Realism with which I am concerned holds that the claim that exemplification is non-relational is obscure, or a mere terminological trick that does not meaningfully engage with the Bradleyan argument. Some formulations of this line of objection follow.
Surely it will not do simply to declare, as Armstrong does, that since [construing exemplification as a relation] is vulnerable to a regress, [Non-Relational Realism] must be true, although it is “inexplicable” [(Amstrong 1978a, 109)] and “profoundly puzzling” [(Armstrong 1978b, 3)]. Denying that universals and particulars are related, and then insisting that their union is simply inexplicable, is hardly satisfactory; Armstrong owes us more here. (Fine 1981, 268)

Armstrong offers us (5) [i.e., ‘a has F-ness’], or the similar, ‘F-ness is in a’ [as synonyms for ‘a exemplifies F-ness’], and simply declares it to be non-relational and inexplicable: particulars are not related to universals but bonded to them in a metaphysical unity…. We have just seen that (5), taken at face value, cannot explain any problem about (3) [i.e. ‘a is F’]: it is a relational statement and so any· problem for (3) is a problem for it. Armstrong avoids this grievous difficulty for Realism by fiat: (5) is not to be taken at face value. How then is it to be taken? Do we have even the remotest idea of what the words ‘in’ and ‘have’ mean here if they are not construed as relational predicates? Armstrong's Realism replaces the explanatory failings of relational Realism with a complete mystery. (Devitt 1997, 98)

It will not do to dismiss this [the Bradleyan regress] as a pseudo-problem, or to dub the new relation a ‘tie’ or ‘nexus’ or something else other than ‘relation’. Clearly for defenders of states of affairs and of universals a way has to be found to block the regress, but simply declaring success by terminology will not do. (Simons 2010, 202)
In response to this objection, Armstrong at least partially concedes that Non-Relational Realism is obscure. He considers Devitt’s accusations of obscurity to be “not implausibl[e]” and “accept[s] some of the force” of the accusations (1997, 110). But in his (1997, 111), he maintains that the obscurity is a price worth paying to be able to retain Realism without initiating the Bradleyan regress.

3. Satisfaction Semantics To the Rescue
As I understand it, the Non-Relational Realist’s claim that exemplification is non-relational is just the claim that ‘exemplification’ and related expressions like ‘instantiate’ do not denote relational universals. The charge that this thesis is obscure must therefore amount to the claim that, if the Non-Relational Realist does not interpret ‘exemplify’ as a name for a relational universal, then she has no satisfactory semantics for the term; thus Devitt’s rhetorical question in the passage quoted above: “[d]o we have even the remotest idea of what the words ‘in’ and ‘have’ mean here [i.e., in sentences like ‘a has F-ness’] if they are not construed as relational predicates?”
	Ironically, Devitt (1997, 96-97), drawing on Quine (1980a), advocates a method of semantics that is perfectly suited to providing semantics for the Non-Relational Realist’s use of ‘exemplify’ (and ‘instantiate’, ‘in’, and ‘has’) namely,
Satisfaction Semantics for predicate ⌜G⌝: 
	⌜G(x1, x2,…, xn)⌝ is true if and only if the ordered n-tuple <x1, x2,…, xn> satisfies ⌜G⌝.
	<x1, x2,…, xn> satisfies ⌜G⌝ if and only if G(x1, x2,…, xn).​[10]​ 
An important insight developed in Quine (1980a) is that recognizing a predicate as meaningful, or as occurring in truth-apt sentences, does not commit us to the existence of a universal serving as its referent. Satisfaction Semantics provides an alternative way of recognizing such a predicate’s meaningfulness. Satisfaction Semantics for ⌜G⌝ states the conditions under which atomic sentences containing the predicate are true or false, and these conditions make no reference to a universal, G-ness. This insight grounds
The Quinean Semantic Strategy: Divest uses of predicates of commitment to universals by interpreting them through Satisfaction Semantics.
 	My suggestion, then, is that Non-Relational Realism be understood as the thesis that ‘exemplify’ is to be interpreted by means of Satisfaction Semantics. On this interpretation,
	‘a exemplifies F-ness’ is true if and only if <a, F-ness> satisfies ‘exemplify’, and
	<a, F-ness> satisfies ‘exemplify’ if and only if a exemplifies F-ness.​[11]​,​[12]​ 
On this interpretation, the truth of ‘a exemplifies F-ness’ in no way presupposes the existence of an exemplification relation—it is not, in Quine’s (1980a) terminology, ontologically committed to an exemplification relation. I will call Non-Relational Realism understood as the application of the Quinean Semantic Strategy to ‘exemplify’ Quinean Non-Relational Realism.
The Non-Relational Realist’s use of the Quinean Semantic Strategy allows her to dodge the obscurity objection. Her thesis is now as clear as Satisfaction Semantics. And prima facie, Satisfaction Semantics is perfectly clear; prima facie we understand what it is for an object to satisfy a predicate. We know that the sky satisfies ‘blue’ just in case the sky is blue, and that grass satisfies ‘green’ just in case grass is green. These examples illustrate the point, made by Quine (1980b, 138), that extensional semantic notions such as truth-in-L, truth-of-in-L, and names-in-L, have “general paradigms” that endow them “with every bit as much clarity, in any particular application, as is enjoyed by the particular expressions of L to which we apply them”. The paradigm governing satisfaction (like that governing truth-of-in-L) is, of course, that the F things and nothing else satisfy ‘F’.
It may be that Satisfaction Semantics is not the best approach to the semantics of predicates per se. But if not, this is not because Satisfaction Semantics is obscure, but rather because positing universals as denotations of predicates captures more of our theoretical desiderata. Furthermore, we are not at present considering the use of Satisfaction Semantics for predicates per se; the Quinean Non-Relational Realist can interpret other predicates in other ways if there are compelling reasons to do so. Finally, Quinean Non-Relational Realism should satisfy at least some of those who have pressed the obscurity objection to Non-Relational Realism, such as Devitt, who regard Satisfaction Semantics (or something equivalent) as acceptable (Devitt 1997, 96-97).
So there is a strong prima facie presumption in favor of the clarity and coherence of Quinean Non-Relational Realism. Furthermore, there are no objections that are powerful enough to upset this presumption. Armstrong is one of the few philosophers to argue that Satisfaction Semantics is obscure. He argues as follows, using ‘applies’ in place of ‘satisfies’.
[T]he semantics of ‘applies’ has been left totally obscure. The Realist may well argue, correctly I believe, that a convincing account of the semantics of ‘applies’ cannot be given without appeal to the properties and/or relations [i.e., the universals] of the object [to which predicates are said to apply] (1997, 108).
Armstrong claims in this passage that Satisfaction Semantics will be unsuccessful unless combined with an account of how an object’s universals make predicates apply to it. The objection begs the question against Satisfaction Semantics, since Armstrong offers no evidence that appeal to universals is needed to explain the semantics of ‘applies’ or ‘satisfies’. The Quinean Non-Relational Realist will give ‘satisfies’ the same semantic interpretation as other predicates: 
	⌜x satisfies G⌝ is true if and only if <x, G-ness> satisfies ‘satisfies’, and
	<x, G-ness> satisfies ‘satisfies’ if and only if x satisfies G.
Why think this interpretation is inadequate? One thing to note is that the term is intended to, in a sense, provide its own interpretation. But this circularity is not a problem. Consider the two possibilities: either satisfaction can be defined in terms of other concepts (not including universals), or it cannot. If it can, then the circularity is eliminable, and so should not concern us. If it cannot, then satisfaction, at least as understood by Quine, is a primitive notion. But I am not aware of any reasons to eschew primitive semantic notions. Certainly, Armstrong has not provided any. Moreover, a primitive concept of satisfaction, even if irreducible, can be elucidated—as noted above, it is governed by the paradigm, “the F things, and nothing else, satisfy ‘F’”. 

4. Are We Ontologically Committed to Exemplification?	
One might wonder whether there is any reason to accept Quinean Non-Relational Realism instead of rejecting universals per se. The broader rejection of universals would, after all, also avoid the Bradleyan regress by subsuming the denial of the existence of an exemplification universal. The primary advantage of Quinean Non-Relational Realism is its immunity to the arguments of Arthur Pap (1959), A. N. Prior (1967), and Frank Jackson (1977) that we are ontologically committed to universals. These arguments show that the leading Quinean attempts to paraphrase particular sentences that would seemingly commit us to color universals (for example, ‘Red is a color’) into sentences that do not so commit us (for example, ‘All red thing are colored’) fail.
But now one might worry that Pap, Prior, and Jackson’s arguments refute the Quinean Semantic Strategy, on which Quinean Non-Relational Realism relies. This would be too hasty. Pap, Prior, and Jackson’s arguments show at most that we are committed to certain specific universals, namely, color universals. None of Pap, Prior, or Jackson, then, has demonstrated that the Quinean Semantic Strategy cannot work for any predicates. But Quinean Non-Relational Realism is not committed to denying the existence of the universals to which Pap, Prior and Jackson have shown us to be committed. Quinean Non-Relational Realism applies the Quinean Semantic Strategy specifically to predicates involved in the Bradleyan regress.​[13]​
Might some sentences be found that demonstrate our commitment to an exemplification universal? There are sentences that many of us will find intuitively plausible and that seem to carry commitment to exemplification. For example:​[14]​
1.	Exemplification is a more problematic relation than parenthood.
2.	Exemplification occurs between two things.
3.	Exemplification is more similar to succession than to parenthood.
Note, first, that the (apparent) conflict is between sentences (1)-(3) and Non-Relational Realism; the sentences pose a challenge for rejection of exemplification per se, and not specifically to the use of the Quinean Semantic Strategy for this purpose. The challenge (1)-(3) pose is therefore independent of the obscurity objection: it is simply that Non-Relational Realism requires that we deny claims that are intuitively plausible. Since I am concerned with the obscurity objection, strictly speaking, the problem posed by sentences (1)-(3) lies outside the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, since my Quinean explication of Non-Relational Realism brings out these worries in a sharp form, this may be a good opportunity to discuss at least the main contours of the responses available to the Non-Relational Realist.
It is worth noting off the bat that some Non-Relational Realists adopt their view in the face of counter-intuitive consequences. Thus Donagan (1963, 226-227) and Armstrong acknowledge recalcitrant intuitions deriving from the subject-predicate sentence form in ordinary and formal languages. According to Armstrong, “language mislead[s] us in this matter” (1978a, 110):
even the expression ‘Fa’ is potentially misleading. It is supposed to symbolize a non-relational situation. But it consists of the two expressions ‘F’ and ‘a’ spatially related to each other in a certain manner…. This presence of relation at the orthographic-phonetic level, it may then be suggested, generates the illusion of relation at the ontological level. (Armstrong 1978a, 110-111)
Armstrong takes the possibility of a language that would not generate this illusion—one in which ‘This is green’ is translated as ‘This’ written in green ink—to detract from the force of the problematic intuitions.
Whether the Non-Relational Realist can successfully deal with (1)-(3) will depend on general methodological questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy. While these methodological questions lie outside the scope of this essay, I will survey some of the main approaches available to the Non-Relational Realist. Consider, first, Quine’s naturalism, which recommends that “we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged” (Quine 1980a, 16). It is unlikely that (1)-(3) will be a part of such a conceptual scheme, for taking them to be true would not help us arrange or fit together the “fragments of raw experience”. (I doubt that the same can be said for the sentences figuring in Pap, Prior, and Jackson’s arguments.) There are, no doubt, many other methodologies that ground similar responses. The basic idea is to maintain that most sentences that are ontologically committed to an exemplification relation, like (1)-(3), have merely limited intuitive appeal, and therefore fall short of providing justification.
Even if we recognize intuitive beliefs in (1)-(3) as justificatory, we may nonetheless hold that the justification they provide is outweighed by competing considerations. It should first be noted in this connection that if intuitions have justificatory force, then they have some degree thereof. On one end of the spectrum are “Moorean” intuitions that strike us as so obvious as to be undeniable—any view that implies the negation of a Moorean intuition must be rejected by reductio ad absurdum. On the other end are vague intuitions about matters at some distance from our familiar interactions with the world. I take it that (1)-(3) lie closer to the latter end of the spectrum, and consistency with these sentences therefore confers only minimal justification. (Again, (1)-(3) contrast, in this respect, with the sentences on which Pap, Prior, and Jackson focus.) The cost of accepting the sentences, however, is significant. Interpreting ‘exemplifies’ as a referring expression leads, first, and most importantly, at least according to the Non-Relational Realist, to a vicious infinite regress; and second, as I discuss in the following section, it leads to a less parsimonious theory.​[15]​
Furthermore, we may be able to reduce the intuitive costs of Quinean Non-Relational Realism, such as they are, by showing that some of the recalcitrant sentences are less intuitively plausible than they initially appear. I believe that (1) can be dealt with in this way. I find (1) implausible in part because I do not understand what it is for one relation to be more “problematic” than another; I am unsure what kinds of problems relations can pose. 
So there is good reason to think the Non-Relational Realist can get away with biting the bullet by simply denying (1)-(3). But in some cases, she may not need to; she might be able to paraphrase some of the recalcitrant sentences and thereby remove their ontological commitment to an exemplification relation. Thus in place of (2):
4.	For all x and y, if x exemplifies y, then x and y both exist.
And in place of (3):
5.	The satisfaction conditions of ‘exemplify’ are more similar to those of ‘succession’ than to those of ‘parenthood’.
There is a strong possibility that these paraphrases could be shown to be inadequate. I reiterate, therefore, that to establish the intuitive plausibility of Non-Relational Realism is not a goal of this essay. I have, over the last few paragraphs, only surveyed and illustrated some of the main approaches to responding to the claim that we are ontologically committed to exemplification.

5. The Selective Quinean Semantic Strategy and Ontological Parsimony
There are two well-known ways of making a theory more parsimonious. The first is to eliminate primitive expressions or reduce them to other, more basic ones. This may be accomplished by an appropriate denial (for example, ‘There are no pain states’) or by a reductive analysis of the expression (for example, ‘A pain state = a state of C-fibers firing’). The second method is the Quinean Semantic Strategy, that is, the adoption of a semantic interpretation that assigns an expression no denotation. Quine tried the second strategy for predicates across the board, as a grammatical category. To avoid the ontological commitments involving particular predicates, on the other hand, it is generally the first strategy of elimination or reduction that is used. The possibility of using the second, semantic strategy for individual expressions, as opposed to whole grammatical categories, as in Quinean Non-Relational Realism, has been wholly overlooked. Employment of this strategy may thus open up new opportunities for making our theories significantly more parsimonious.
One might deny that selective application of the Quinean Semantic Strategy can increase parsimony on the ground that parsimony is at stake in the decision to accept universals per se, but not in the individual decisions to accept specific universals.​[16]​ According to this view, once we accept one universal, admitting more will not make our theory any less parsimonious.
The problem with this objection is that it relies on too coarse-grained an understanding of parsimony. Suppose we employed a mathematical theory that was committed, in addition to the posits of a more standard formulation of Peano arithmetic, to a simple primeness universal, and that it were then discovered how to eliminate the commitment to primeness by defining it in terms of identity, division, and the class of integers. This discovery would, of course, make our theory more parsimonious by allowing us to posit one fewer universal. This intuition is reflected in the standard account of qualitative parsimony:
Qualitative Ontological Parsimony (OP): If theory T1 posits fewer types or kinds of entity than theory T2, then all things being equal, we should prefer T1.​[17]​
Now I take it that, in many cases, distinct universals constitute distinct types or kinds. For example, the universals primeness, goodness, courage, whiteness, and motherhood are all distinct universals and distinct kinds. Avoiding commitment to specific universals therefore promotes parsimony even for Realists.
Armstrong’s and Lewis’s conceptions of laws of nature give us one reason to think (some) universals are kinds. Armstrong (1978b, 148-157) sees laws of nature as relations between universals. According to Lewis (1983, 366), laws are regularities between what he calls ‘natural properties’, which in turn are defined in terms of universals: the idea is that a property—which for Lewis is a class of possibilia—is natural to the extent that its elements exemplify the members of a “close-knit family” of universals (Lewis 1983, 347). On both of these views, some universals are clearly treated as kinds; on Armstrong’s view, universals are the primary components of laws, and on Lewis’s, the entities of which these components are made. And it is clear that a reduction in the number of components of (components of) natural laws constitutes an increase in parsimony.
But even if one rejects Armstrong’s and Lewis’s conceptions of natural laws, there is still good reason to view exemplification as a kind. The core of the notion of a natural kind is the idea of a grouping of objects that is not artificial or guided by human interests. Exemplification would effect a grouping, which would contain the pairs of things that would exemplify exemplification, namely, <the White House, whiteness>, <the Abernethy Pearl, whiteness>, etc. And it would effect this grouping independently of human interests: ‘exemplification’ figures in the law stating that if Q(x1, x2,…, xn), then <x1, x2,…, xn> exemplifies Q-ness.​[18]​
Finally, some have advocated, in addition to OP,
Quantitative Ontological Parsimony: If theory T1 posits fewer total entities (of a given type or kind) than theory T2, then all things being equal, we should prefer T1. (Nolan 1997, 340)
Unlike OP, Quantitative Parsimony is not widely accepted; Lewis (1973, 87) rejects it. However, it does have its defenders (Nolan 1997). And it very straightforwardly justifies applying the Quinean Semantic Strategy selectively to ‘exemplifies’; such an application would make our theory committed to one fewer entity (of the kind universal).

6. Semantic Heterogeneity
If we interpret ‘exemplify’ along the lines of Satisfaction Semantics while taking other predicates to denote universals, we will have opted for an unusual kind of semantic heterogeneity. The heterogeneity is unusual in that, typically, semanticists decide all at once whether the predicates of their language, considered as a grammatical category, are syncategorematic or denoting. This heterogeneity might be a source of dissatisfaction with Quinean Non-Relational Realism. In this section, I will consider two objections along these lines.
Goodman and Quine argue that “[e]scape from [the class-theoretic] paradoxes can apparently be effected only by recourse to alternative rules whose artificiality and arbitrariness arouse suspicion that we are lost in a world of make-believe” (1947, 105). They believe that this artificiality and arbitrariness motivate rejection of the theory of classes. Heterogeneous semantics, it might be argued, is similarly an ad hoc and artificial revision of the more natural Relational Realism, according to which exemplification is a relation (and is denoted by ‘exemplify’). This is the first objection to semantic heterogeneity I want to consider.
The second objection holds that Relational Realism’s semantic theory is more syntactically elegant than Quinean Non-Relational Realism’s, and should be preferred for this reason. Relational Realism, let us suppose, gives a uniform semantics for its atomic sentences on which, for any (primitive) predicate ⌜G⌝ and any name ⌜a⌝,  ⌜Ga⌝ is true just in case ⌜G⌝ denotes a universal Q-ness, ⌜a⌝ denotes an object x, and x exemplifies Q-ness.​[19]​ The Quinean Non-Relational Realist, by contrast, will divide her predicates into two categories, and her semantic interpretation will then have two distinct clauses, one for each category: Satisfaction Semantics for the one category and the Relational Realist’s semantics for the other. The Relational Realist’s single clause is more elegant than the Quinean Non-Relational Realist’s two.
In response to the first objection, the Quinean Non-Relational Realist can deny that artificiality and arbitrariness are serious problems for a theory. I believe that this is a corollary of Rudolf Carnap’s influential defense of theories of abstract objects, including class theory, against Goodman and Quine’s argument. According to Carnap, the decision whether or not to posit a given entity is entirely a matter of whether the posit will be fruitful for inquiry:
The acceptance or rejection of abstract linguistic forms, just as the acceptance or rejection of any other linguistic forms in any branch of science, will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments, the ratio of the results achieved to the amount and complexity of the efforts required. To decree dogmatic prohibitions of certain linguistic forms instead of testing them by their success or failure in practical use, is worse than futile; it is positively harmful because it may obstruct scientific progress. (Carnap 1956, 221)
But a concept can be an efficient instrument in inquiry even if it is artificial or arbitrary.
A second response is to grant that Quinean Non-Relational Realism is artificial and arbitrary, and syntactically inelegant, and that these are all costs of the view, while maintaining that avoidance of the Bradleyan regress is worth the cost.
A third response is to invoke the considerations of section 5 and argue that Quinean Non-Relational Realism is more ontologically parsimonious than Relational Realism. The thought is that by denying the existence of exemplification, the Non-Relational Realist posits one fewer kind or type of entity than the Relational Realist. With regard to the first objection, this would mean that Quinean Non-Relational Realism is not ad hoc or artificial. Rather, the Realist might adopt it as part of a general strategy of minimizing her ontological commitments. Avoidance of the Bradleyan regress would then be an added bonus. With regard to the second objection, the present response would mean that the price of syntactic inelegance would buy not only avoidance of the regress, but also ontological parsimony.
It is also worth noting that the appeal of the kind of heterogeneous semantics I am considering grows with the number of predicates interpreted through Satisfaction Semantics. This is because the inelegance inherent in the approach is due to the creation of two separate classes of terms, each requiring its own clause in the semantic theory. Adding to the class of predicates interpreted by Satisfaction Semantics will not require further clauses in the semantic theory, and will therefore have no further effect on elegance. Such predicates can be interpreted by the Satisfaction Semantics machinery that is already in place. Many of these additions to the class of predicates interpreted by means of Satisfaction Semantics will, however, reduce the number of kinds to which the theory is committed, and thereby make the theory more parsimonious.

7. Conclusion
I have argued that Non-Relational Realism, one of the most popular responses to the Bradleyan regress, should be understood as the adoption of Satisfaction Semantics—which Quine advocated for predicates generally—specifically for ‘exemplifies’ and similar terms like ‘instantiates’. The resulting view—Quinean Non-Relational Realism—is not vulnerable to one of the most influential objections against Non-Relational Realism, namely, that it is obscure. The Quinean Non-Relational Realist’s strategy of using Satisfaction Semantics to drain uses of particular predicates of their ontological commitment has so far been overlooked, but by applying it elsewhere, we may see significant gains in parsimony.
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^1	  I would like to thank Chad Carmichael, Carlotta Pavese, Karl Schafer, and audiences at the Indiana Philosophical Assocation’s 2013 Conference and the 2013 Pittsburgh Area Philosophy Colloquium for helpful feedback on previous versions of this essay.
^2	  While twentieth century discussions of universals frequently invoke Bradley’s arguments, the extent to which such discussions accurately represent his actual views is a delicate interpretive question that I wish to sidestep. I am concerned with the recent debate surrounding the regress arguments that Bradley inspired; I am concerned with the Bradleyan regress. For a discussion of the differences between Bradley’s argument and the Bradleyan argument that has figured in more recent literature, see Anna-Sofia Maurin (2012, 795-796).
^3	  See Maurin (2012) for a useful typology and survey of responses.
^4	  For a defense of Entitative Explanation, see Maurin (2012, 802).
^5	  Why stop the regress at the second stage rather than the third or, say, the 77th? It seems to me that there is no reason to think the earlier stages are more in need of a unifier than the later stages. Non-Relational Realism is therefore a natural position for Realists who want to avoid the Bradleyan regress by denying Entitative Explanation.
^6	  Gail Fine (1981, 268-269) objects to Armstrong’s claim that Aristotle was a Non-Relational Realist.
^7	  For an incisive discussion of these aspects of Armstrong’s view, see Fine (1981, 266-267).
^8	  There is a problem for Armstrong’s views that Quinean Non-Relational Realism does not solve. This is the tension between his acceptance of Plato’s one-over-many argument (Armstrong 1978, xiii) and Non-Relational Realism. Applying a one-over-many argument to the observation that both <the White House, whiteness> and <the Abernethy Pearl, whiteness> exemplify exemplification leads to the conclusion that there is a relation of exemplification. My solution is intended for those Realists who are not moved by the one-over-many argument. (I am persuaded by Devitt’s (1997) objection to one-over-many arguments.)
^9	  For this objection, see Fine (1981, 268), Michael Devitt (1997, 98), and Peter Simons (2010, 202). And see section 2 below.
^10	  The point of the detour through satisfaction conditions—as opposed to relying entirely on the second clause—is that these conditions provide the groundwork for a recursive definition of truth for the language, and in this way are part of a genuine semantics. In particular, using the satisfaction conditions for an atomic sentence, we can state satisfaction conditions for sentences containing truth-functional connectives and quantifiers. For example, a sequence x satisfies the negation of formula p if and only if x does not satisfy p. See Quine (1986, Chapter 3).
^11	  I take Non-Relational Realism to be part of the semantics for a revisionary, as opposed to descriptive, metaphysical theory. The descriptive metaphysician gives an account of how we in fact view the world, whereas the revisionary metaphysician seeks to improve our view. (The distinction is due to Strawson (1959, Introduction).) For this reason, I will set aside the question of the fit between Satisfaction Semantics for ‘exemplify’ and the data concerning actual use of the term.
^12	  I take it that Devitt’s notion of the “application” of a predicate to an object (Devitt 1997, 96) is equivalent to the Tarskian notion of Satisfaction, which is employed by Quine (1986).
^13	  I have so far focused exclusively on the question whether we are ontologically committed to universals or to particular universals. Quine’s suggestion that we are not so committed was one of several different reasons he gave for denying the existence of universals. Up until at least 1947, his rejection of universals was a part of his nominalism, i.e. his rejection of abstract objects, including not just universals, but also classes, numbers, and propositions. Frost-Arnold (2013, ch. 2) gives a thorough discussion of Quine’s various unpublished arguments for nominalism. Quine’s published arguments for nominalism are in his (1947) and Goodman and Quine (1947). In those papers, he and Goodman declare the existence of abstract objects to be counter-intuitive and accuse the theory of classes of being “artificial and arbitrary” (Goodman and Quine 1947, 105). Sometime after 1947, Quine accepted the existence of classes and numbers, thereby abandoning his strict nominalism. However, he continued to reject universals, but now did so as a part of his extensionalism, i.e. his rejection of intensions. During this period, which lasted for the rest of his career, Quine believed that (a) intensions lacked intelligible individuation conditions, (b) there is reason to avoid positing any entity that lacks intelligible individuation conditions, and (c) intensions are dispensable to our best scientific theories. Arguments like those of Pap, Prior, and Jackson purport to show that claim (c) is false. Unfortunately, it is unclear how Quine would have reacted were he convinced of their arguments. The use of the Quinean Semantic Strategy that I advocate would not have been available to him if he took the need for clear individuation conditions to trump scientific indispensability, but otherwise, it would have been. And, of course, it is available to philosophers who reject either (a) or (b), but who recognize the Quinean Semantic Strategy as a way of making theories more parsimonious.
^14	  These sentences were put to me by an anonymous referee.
^15	  The methodology discussed here is advocated by Theodore Sider and labeled ‘mainstream metaphysics’ by David Manley (2009, 4). On this approach,competing positions are treated as tentative hypotheses about the world, and are assessed by a loose battery of criteria for theory choice. Match with ordinary usage and belief sometimes plays a role in this assessment, but typically not a dominant one. (Sider 2009, 385; quoted in Manley 2009, 3)
^16	  An anonymous referee raised this objection.
^17	  This is the account of parsimony given by Alan Baker (2013) and defended by David Lewis (1973, 87).
^18	  In addition to the core conditions on natural kindhood just mentioned, many others have been proposed. Though I will not go through all of these proposed conditions, I see no difficulty in exemplification’s meeting them. In any case, I hope to at least have shifted the burden of argument onto the objector, who must now propose a plausible necessary condition on kindhood and show that an exemplification universal would not meet this condition.
^19	  Traditional Realists, like Russell (1988), use universals in their semantics in this way. Armstrong (1978b, Ch. 13) does not take all predicates to denote universals. For simplicity, I frame the discussion to follow in terms of the more traditional account. However, the points I will make straightforwardly extend mutatis mutandis to approaches like Armstrong’s.
